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The purpose of this paper is to explain why some markets for financial products take off
while others vanish as soon as they have emerged. To this end, we model an infinite sequence
of CAPM-economies in which financial products can be used for insurance purposes. Agents'
participation in these financial products, however, is restricted. Consecutive stage economies are
linked by a mapping ("transition function") which determines the next period's participation struc-
ture from the preceding period's participation. The transition function generates a dynamic process
of market participation which is driven by the percentage of informed traders and the rate at
which a new asset is adopted. We then analyse the evolutionary stability of stationary equilibria.
In accordance with the empirical literature on financial innovation, it is obtained that the success
of a financial innovation, a mutation, depends on a sufficiently high trading volume, marketing,
and new and differentiated hedging opportunities. In particular, a set of complete markets forming
a stationary equilibrium is robust with respect to any further financial innovation while this is not
necessarily true for a set of incomplete markets.
"There is no generally accepted theory of financial innovation, but some broad general-
izations of the innovation process are possible. What matters is not the invention of a
financial product or process (which is often obscure) but its diffusion through the market
environment" .
Ted Padolski (1987) in: The New Palgrave on Money and Finance: Financial
Innovation and Money Supply (p. 68)
1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development and unprecedented growth of international financial markets over
the last two decades' has become the object of intensive economic research. Literally every
day an abundance of new financial assets is created on these markets; some of these new
securities soon become standard instruments of financial trade, other ones disappear as
quickly as they have emerged. This extensive process of financial innovation has led to
deep structural changes in the scope and range of international financial markets.
This paper sets out from the claim that the development of financial markets must
be regarded as a fundamentally dynamic process, connecting a series of basic historical
changes. Therefore, we postulate that the analysis of the process of financial innovation
requires treatment within a truly dynamic model.2 As the process of financial innovation
is stimulated by a variety of different reasons, each leading to a different range of financial
products, we think of causes for a specific innovation as a black box, assuming that,
for whatever reason, new assets can perpetually enter the market. Then we consider an
evolutionary selection process which distinguishes stable asset structures from such asset
1 For an assessment see Tufano (1989) and Miller (1992).
2. This need for a model describing the ongoing process of financial innovation is one of the main
conclusions of the well known empirical research by Silber (1981) and Black (1986).
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structures which are likely to be modified by the innovation of some new financial product.
Building on the applied literature on this topic we assume that a high level of market
participation generated by a certain financial security is one of the key determinants of
its "survival" in the market. This observation has already been summarized by Black
(1986), page 1:
"What do we mean by success or failure? A successful contract innovation attracts a
lot of trading interest, draws many people to the pit and generates substantial order
flow from off-the-floor participants. On the other hand, some contracts are intro-
duced, and although a few people stand in the pit at the exchange, there is not enough
interest or orders from other market participants to continue supporting the contract.
The floor traders leave the pit and the exchange no longer provides floor space or
price reports for the contract-it is a failure".
The empirical literature moreover suggests that the key determinants of market partici-
pation itself are trading volume and liquidity;' degree of novelty and awareness."
The essential ingredient of our evolutionary model is a standard (static) general
equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets (GEl-model), where investors' mar-
ket participation is assumed to be asymmetrically restricted." In such a model, investors
are characterized not only by their respective endowments and their preferences (which
we assume to be of the CAPM-type), but also by the subset of assets which they are able
to trade on the market. We consider an intertemporal sequence of these stage economies,
where we assume stationarity of all the standard GEl-characteristics. The proportion of
investors trading in certain assets, however, varies over consecutive periods. This pro-
portion can be interpreted as a "market participation rate". Using some transition func-
tion, which again is stationary, the evolution of market participation rates is modelled.
Thus, starting from arbitrary initial conditions, an iterative dynamical process is defined
allowing an analysis of its stationary equilibria (fixed points).
First, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary equili-
bria, both for the cases of uniform participation and of mixed participation. In the former
case, every asset is used by either everyone or by no one, while in the latter case there is
some asset which is traded by some of the agents but not by all of them. We then analyse
which of the stationary equilibria are robust with respect to small perturbations of the
market participation rates. We investigate whether some new assets which have not been
traded so far ("mutations") can succeed in being established in the market. We call
stationary equilibria evolutionarily stable if there is an entry barrier for the participation
rates of new assets, below which these assets will be pushed back out of the market.
Moreover, a stationary equilibrium is called asymptotically stable, if for any sufficiently
small perturbation of the corresponding market participation rates the dynamical process
converges back to the stationary equilibrium. An asymptotically stable stationary equilib-
rium thus always is evolutionarily stable. In our model, the case of complete participation
always is asymptotically stable if it happens to form a stationary equilibrium. Incomplete
3. This view is commonly held by applied as well as by theoretical economists (see Black (1986), Tufano
(1989), Miller (1986), Duffie and Rahi (1995) or "The Economist" (1996». According to Black (1986) traders
prefer to "cross-hedge" the insurance possibilities offered by a new and hence relatively illiquid asset using well
established liquid markets.
4. It is obvious that without being aware of the existence of a certain financial instrument one cannot
trade in that instrument. According to Simon (1955), bounded rationality begins with the observation that
individuals are not aware of all the choices available to them.
5. Such models were studied first by Merton (1987), Siconolfi (1986, 1989)and Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi
(1990). Also see Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997).
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uniform participation phases are evolutionarily stable only with respect to such assets
which do not generate a sufficiently high trading volume, which do not offer sufficiently
new and differentiated hedging opportunities, or which are not supported by an adequate
marketing effort." Moreover, mixed participation equilibria never are asymptotically
stable in our model.
The issue of financial innovation has recently received a lot of attention in economic
theory." The literature has mainly focused on optimal security design, i.e. on the inno-
vator's decision problem, especially in the presence of asymmetric information. The
models presented so far are of an inherently static nature. In general, only two time
periods are considered." In the first period, imperfect competition between financial inter-
mediaries (banks, brokering institutions, exchanges) is modelled, which determines some
endogenous financial market structure. In a second step, this structure is used as the
exogenous market structure for the well-known static GEl-financial market model. All of
these models have to make rather strong assumptions on innovators' rationality. In par-
ticular, in these models financial intermediaries can perfectly anticipate every possible
consequence of their alternative financial innovations. However, imperfect competition
between financial intermediaries is a deep and very challenging problem, especially if one
adds imperfect competition to a general equilibrium model. In fact, a recent paper by
Corch6n and Mas-Colell (1996) shows that games with imperfect competition can have
indeterminate equilibria even if the corresponding GE-economy with perfect competition
happens to have a unique equilibrium. We wish to avoid tackling this delicate issue.
Instead, we take a complementary point of view by leaving the "obscure" process of asset
creation to a black box and studying the diffusion of assets through the market environ-
ment. Yet, our approach can also serve as a dynamic alternative to the results obtained
in the corresponding static models which depend on rather strong rationality assumptions,
whereas our approach is based on principles of bounded rationality and does not need to
consider intermediaries at all.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, the static CAPM-economy with
restricted participation is introduced and some useful properties of the stage economy are
derived. Section 3 sets up the evolutionary process and defines corresponding inter-
temporal equilibrium and stability notions. Section 4 derives our main results illustrating
them by some simple examples. Section 5 concludes the paper by giving an outlook on
further research building on our evolutionary approach.
2. THE STAGE ECONOMY
2.1. The RPGEI-model
The first step of our evolutionary approach to financial innovation consists in the
definition of a suitable stationary stage economy. The basis of the financial markets model
6. The role of marketing in CAPM-economies with restricted participation has previously been studied
by Merton (1987). Similar to our interpretation, Merton considers the restriction in market participation as a
lack of information about the existence of an asset. Merton (1987) then studies a monopolistic intermediary
who chooses the optimal amount of marketing effort which balances the revenues from additionally informed
agents and the cost of marketing.
7. For a summary see the survey article by Duffie and Rahi (1995) in the JET Symposium on Financial
Innovation and the book by Allen and Gale (1994).
8. Models of the type discussed here are used for example in Cuny (1993), Duffie and Jackson (1989),
Heller (1993), Allen and Gale (1994), Bisin (1998), Pesendorfer (1995) and Williamson (1996).
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at each stage of the evolutionary process is given by the standard GEl-model. For sim-
plicity we assume that there is only one consumption good, which is divisible and perish-
able, and which is interpreted as a composite commodity. Moreover, there are two periods
with uncertainty in the second period, which is modelled by S possible states s =1, ... , S.
Hence, consumption takes place on S+ 1 spot markets indexed by s =0 for the first period
and by s =1, ... , S for the second period. There are I types of individuals i =1, ... , I,
where each type consists of a continuum [0, 1] of identical agents. Hence, every agent is
characterized by a utility-endowment combination ur, 0/) for ie I, where u' is a utility
function mapping lR S + I into IR and (OiElR s + I.
Since the main point of this paper is not to investigate the most general allocation
problem, the following rather strong assumption on the individuals' utility functions will
be made.
Assumption (CAPM). u'. IR S + I ~lR is given by Ui(x) =Xo + I:= I Ps(xs -!yi(xs)2),
where r'> 0 is the coefficient oftype i's risk aversion.
For the analysis of GEl-economies with objective probabilities ps > 0 for s =1, ... ,S,
it is convenient to define the p-adjusted scalar product in IRs:
0: IRs x IRs~lR, where xOy:= I:= I xspsYs.
We will later make use of the norm 11·11: IRs~IR defined by IIYII:= ~yOy, and we will call
any two vectors x, yE IRs "orthogonal" (with respect to p) if xOy =0.9 •
In the first period, agents can trade an exogenously given set of assets je J. Assets are
"real", i.e. they payoff in units of the single consumption good. They can be distinguished
by their payoff-vectors AjE IR s. The set of all assets J can then be viewed as an S x J-
matrix, i.e. A =[AI, ... , AJ]E IR s x J. The set of assets J is the set out of which the evol-
utionary process draws its mutations. We think of J to be a very large set allowing for all
possible constellations of asset markets in which agents eventually participate. Since trad-
ing volume is one of the key driving forces of the evolutionary process, we will assume
that all assets in J have unit length according to the objective probability measure
pE IR~, i.e.IIAjll =1 for alljEJ. This normalization allows to give a meaningful definition
of trading volume while not restricting the key characteristic of any GEl-model which is
the market subspace (A), i.e. the column space of the asset matrix A. Markets will be said
to be "complete" whenever the payoffs of the assets span the entire state space, i.e. when-
ever (A) =IRs. Otherwise, markets are incomplete. An asset with payoffs which are
spanned by those of some other assets are called "redundant". Hence, an asset Aj is
redundant if there is a portfolio BEIR J such that Aj = Lboj BkAk.
In the standard GEl-model, every agent is able to trade each available asset. Here,
agents can only use certain subsets of the assets. Considering the enormous amount of
different assets available on today's financial markets this does not seem to be an implaus-
ible assumption. Especially for the discussion of the emergence of new assets (innovation),
it seems rather reasonable to consider situations where-to start with-only a small pro-
portion of all the traders are both aware of this new trading opportunity and prepared to
adopt it as a new trading instrument." Denoting by BEIR J agent i's asset portfolio and
by qE IR J the vector of asset prices,'! we therefore consider the following decision problem
9. For these definitions and their role in CAPM-economies see for example Magill and Quinzii (1996,
Chapter 3).
10. For a motivation of this assumption in the context of financial markets also see Merton (1987).
11. We use the common notation in which prices (quantities) are denoted by row (column) vectors.
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of an individual agent of type i who is restricted to trade only such assets j which are
contained in a given subset KcJ of all the assets"
(P~f,) max Ui(x)
XEIR S + !
6EIRJ
s.t. (x - coi ) = (~q)6
8j=0 ifj~K.
Observe that the definition of (piff,) implicitly assumes that the budget constraint
(x - Qi) ~Cl)8 is satisfied with equality. This will be the case in equilibrium if either the
market institutions do not allow for free disposal in the second period or if preferences
are monotonic at the equilibrium consumption vector. Such a monotonicity condition can
be ensured in the CAPM by choosing sufficiently small coefficients of individual risk
aversion yi> °for i e I.13
Due to our assumptions, agents of the same type are distinguished only by the set K
describing the set of assets an individual is able to trade. Therefore, for every type of
agents ie I and every set KcJ one can define the sets f,K of all agents of type i who can
exactly trade in those assets contained in K. In the sequel, the economy will be specified
such as to ensure that these sets are Borel-measurable for every ie I and K k J. Hence,
one can define constants pi(K), ie I, KkJ by
p'(Kr> Lebesgue-measure (f,K).
Thus, pi(.) describes the distribution of the awareness restrictions imposed on agents of
type i. Observe that each pi(-) is a probability measure on .9(J):= {K k J}.
Lacking a clear understanding of how various endowment-utility combinations may
affect market participation of an agent, we make two simplifying assumptions on the
participation structures considered. First, we assume that all types of agents are identically
restricted with respect to their market participation. This assumption will later allow us
to obtain a simple solution for the equilibria of the stage economies.
Assumption (P). There is a p such that p = pi for every ie I.
Secondly, we restrict attention to such participation structures which are completely
characterized by the proportion rj of agents knowing asset j. Since for a general partici-
pation structure p the proportion of agents knowing asset j is given by
rj=LKCJ,jEKP(K),
we therefore consider the participation structures p e [0, 1]2J for which there exists a vector
re [0, If such that
p(K):= p'(K) =llkEKrk ll/EK(I - r/),
for every K k J. We will denote such probability distributions by r'. r e [0, If, in order to
indicate the J-dimensional vector of factors corresponding to pr, and we will frequently
12. For a decision-theoretic notion of awareness, which can be viewed as a foundation of this decision
problem, see also Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998).
13. It is well known, for example, that if markets are complete the assumption 1 - yiL~ = ! ro~ > 0 for every
iE I and every SE S suffices to show monotonicity of preferences on the relevant domain of allocations. Similar
conditions can be found for the case of incomplete markets (see Siwik (2000)).
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refer to the vector r as the "(market) participation structure" or "participation phase" .14
Besides simplification of analysis, there is one important property of participation
structures described by a phase r e [0, If: In this case the participation rates of each of
the individual assets are mutually uncorrelated in the sense that the knowledge of some
particular asset does not favour the knowledge of any other asset." In practice it might
often be the case that information about different assets is not acquired in such an inde-
pendent way as postulated here; lacking a clear understanding, however, how the partici-
pation rate in some asset might affect the participation rate in another asset, this mutual
independence seems the most natural assumption to start with.
We will often devote our attention to some relatively simple but important partici-
pation structures, namely those structures r' where rje {O, I} for all assets je J. With such
a participation structure every agent is considering trading within the same non-empty
subset of assets. Such structures are called uniform participation structures while the other
structures are called mixed participation structures. Observe that uniform participation
structures correspond to the standard GEl-situation without restricted participation.
With these definitions, the characteristics of the stage economies can be summarized
as
RPGEI = {IRS + 1, A, (Vi, O/)ieh (rj)jeJ},
where RPGEI stands for a general equilibrium economy with incomplete markets and
restricted participation.
2.2. RPGEI-equilibria and associated trading volumes
In an RPGEI-economy, the definition of RPGEI-equilibria can be stated as follows. Here,
the superscript (i, K) for i e I and K k J is meant to indicate an arbitrary agent of type i
contained in the set Ji,K.
Definition 1. A tuple ({-,8,q)elR(fX2J)X(S+I)xlR(fX2J)XJxIRJ is called a restricted
participation equilibrium with incomplete markets (RPGEI-equilibrium) at a given partici-
pation structure re [0, 1]J if it satisfies the following conditionsi'"
(i) {-i,K, 8i,K) solves (P~IJ,) given q for every (i, K)elx .!?(J);
*.(ii) Lief LKr;;Jpr(K)· BI,K =0, and
(..i) ~ ~ r (K) * i K ~ i111 L..ief L..Kr;;JP . X' =L..ief ar,
The simplifying restrictions placed on the relevant participation structures as well as
the assumption of quadratic utilities allow to explicitly solve for RPGEI-equilibria. In
particular, this is a consequence of the following result which states that the innovation
of a non-redundant asset in the quadratic CAPM does not change the equilibrium price
14. It is easy to see that for any rE[O, llJ the vector pr defined by pr(K):=IlkEKrkIll~K(1-rl)' for every
K c J, is in fact a probability measure on the power set g(J). By construction, the set of all such probability
measures can be identified with [0, I]", In particular, it follows that this set is non-empty.
15. Consider the indicator variables X;: L9'(J)~{O, I} for JEJ with X;(K) = 1 if and only ii je K. It can
easily be shown that cov [X;, Xk ] =0 whenever jek, provided X; and Xk are distributed according to a probability
measure of the form pro
16. Observe that the third condition in Definition 1 is redundant by the definition of the maximization
problem (P~lf,).
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of the existing assets." As a further piece of notation we define 1 := (1, ... , I)E IRs, and,
for any S + l-dimensional vector x = (xo, Xl, ... ,XS)TE IR S + I, we let Xl := (Xl, ... , XS)T.
Lemma 1 (Market Partition Lemma). Given {A, (Vi, o/)}, for every K ~ J consider
the standard GEl-economies parameterized by r, {IR S + I, A, (U\ 0/);= I, r}, where all the
agents are restricted to trade exactly in those assets contained in K, i.e. where rj =1 for je
K and rj =0 for j~ K. It then follows that, the equilibrium asset prices do not vary with K,
i.e. that the equilibrium asset prices q(K) of these economies satisfy qiK) = tv(K') for each
jEKnK'.
Proof Let K ~ J be fixed, and consider a GEl-economy where all agents trade
exactly in those assets contained in K. Without loss of generality" assume that K =J.
Then agent i's maximization problem can be rewritten as
max m~-qli+ 1 O(m~+A8i)- r i (m~+A8i)O(m~+A8i).
eielR J 2
Hence, the first order condition for this problem becomes
1 ..
---: (1 OA -q) =(m l] +A8jOA.
r'
*.
Summing over types of agents, inserting the equilibrium condition L;= I 8 1 = 0, defining
I' I'1(:=Li= I (Iii) and m] := Li= I ml], and observing the fact that the unboundedness of the
consumption sets guarantees an interior solution, then yields equilibrium prices qas
q=(1-~rol)OA.
But then, obviously, tv does not depend on the pay-off structure of any asset other than
asset j. II
From the Market Partition Lemma one concludes that the price of an asset only
depends on preferences and endowments but not on the other assets present in the econ-
omy. This property together with the CAPM-assumption suffices to prove the existence
of a unique RPGEI-equilibrium I 9 as long as the assets in the economy are not redundant.
In the presence of redundant assets, equilibrium allocations of consumption bundles still
are unique but uniqueness of individual portfolio decisions obviously can no longer be
expected.
Proposition 1. Suppose every agent can only trade in a non-redundant set of assets.
Then there exists a unique RPGEI-equilibrium.
Proof Stratify the economy into those subeconomies consisting only of agents being
able to trade exactly in the same non-empty subset of assets KcJ. By Assumption (P) all
those subeconomies have the same endowment-preference characteristics (which are just
17. This result can, for example, also be found in Oh (1994).
18. Note in particular that we do not assume that J forms a complete set of assets.
19. While for more general preferences existence of an equilibrium can still be proven (see Siconolfi (1986,
1989) and Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997)), uniqueness of such an equilibrium can no longer be expected.
For a recent overview over uniqueness results for standard GEl-economies see Hens, Schmedders and Voss
(1999).
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IIjE K.
scaled differently). From the proof of the Market Partition Lemma, it is now clear that
equilibria for these subeconomies exist, that they are unique, and, moreover, that asset
prices are the same across all the subeconomies. Hence, the equilibrium prices qof the
subeconomies also form an equilibrium price vector for the global RPGEI-economy.
It remains to show that q* is the unique equilibrium price vector for the RPGEI-
economy. This, however, can be inferred from the monotonicity of the market demand
function
O(q):= L~= 1 LKkJpr(K)Oi,K(q)
which is defined on the set of no arbitrage-prices (see Magill and Quinzii (1966».20 By
assumption (CAPM), utility functions are quasi-linear in first period consumption, Quasi-
linearity of preferences implies monotonicity of individual asset demand functions Oi,K
(see the first-order condition derived in the proof of the Market Partition Lemma); and
since aggregation preserves this property (see, for example, Hildenbrand and Kirman
(1988», market demand is, in fact, monotonic in prices in this economy. Finally, note
that if pr(K) = 0 for some K then the equilibrium consumption allocations are still unique
but the equilibrium prices qj, jE K are arbitrary. In this case we choose
qj=(l-~rol)OAj'
For a given participation structure r and an associated RPGEI-equilibrium price
vector q(r), let now voI5(K, r):= I8;K(r)Ibe the RPGEI-equilibrium trading volume in asset
j as effected by an agent of type i who is restricted to trade only in those assets contained
in K k ~(r):= {jEJlrj> 0}.21 For vol~(K, r) to be well defined ~(r) is assumed to be a
non-redundant set of assets. Aggregating over types of agents and all the possible
restricting subsets of J, one then obtains total trading volume in asset j as
vj(r):= L~= 1 LK k K+(r)pr(K) vol~(K, r)
= LK f;;; K+(p)pr(K) vol, (K, r),
I .
where vOlj(K, r):= Li= 1 volj(K, r). It should be noted that the summation can only be
taken over sets contained in K+(r), since for other sets the associated asset demand is not
defined at the participation structure r.
As a consequence of the Market Partition Lemma, the volume function has a very
useful property: The aggregate trading volume of asset j in the population of agents con-
sidering trade in the subset K of assets, i.e. vol, (K, r), is independent of the market partici-
pation phase r.
Proposition 2. For each K k J and for every je K, there exists a positive constant
af such that vOlj(K, r) =af for any rE[O, l]J with ~(r) ~ K, where ~(r) is non-redundant.
Proof Trading volume vol] (K, r) of an individual trader knowing assets contained
in K only depends on the equilibrium prices q(K). But prices q(K) are independent of the
participation structure by the previous Market Partition Lemma. Hence, independently
of r (i.e. independently of the relative sizes of the 2 J subeconomies restricted to trade
20. Here, (Ji,K(q) is the portfolio used in thesolution to the maximization problem (P~lf,) for given prices q.
21. Here, similar to the previous footnote, (J i,K(r) is a solution to the maximization problem (P~If,) for given
£1(r).
BETTZUGE & HENS FINANCIAL INNOVATION 501
assets in K), equilibrium prices for the RPGEI-economy are given by q == q(J). Therefore,
af := vol, (K, r) is constant over r. II
The simple participation structures considered in this paper then allow for an explicit
characterization of the equilibrium trading volumes in our stage economies. In order to
further simplify notation, we let r\j:= (rl' ... , ri-«, rj+ 1, ... ,rJ)e [0, 1]J-I.
Corollary 1. For every asset jeJ and every participation structure re [0, I]J, trading
volume is linear in rb je ~(r), i.e. there are constants J.lj such that vAr) =J.lj' rj. Here, the
constants /lj are given by
/lj:= /lj(r\j, a j):= /lj(r\j, (af)K f;;; J):= LK f;;; J\{j} (TIkeKrd (TII~K,l",j (1 - rl»afU U }.
Proof This follows from the fact that pr(K) = 0 if je K, for someje ~(r). II
Note that /lj(r\j, aj) gives the trading volume of asset j generated in the RPGEI-
economy where every agent knows this asset (i.e. rj =1) and participation in the other
assets is described by r\j' Observe also that the linearity of the volume function implies
that volume is continuously differentiable on the entire set [0, If of participation phases.
Computing an asset's trading volume simplifies even further, when the asset structure
is "p-orthogonal't.f
Lemma 2. Suppose A = {A 1, ... , AJ} is such that Aj 0 A k =0 for ft=k ("p-orthogonal
asset structure"). Then af = a~ if je K and af = 0 otherwise.
Proof Recall that 1(:= L~= 1 (l/Yi) and that (0] denotes aggregate endowments in
the second period. Let A K be the S x K submatrix of A formed by the column vectors
associated with the assets contained in K. Using the same line of reasoning as in the proof
of the Market Partition Lemma, one can then derive equilibrium asset demand of a type
i-agent trading only K as
li(K) = ~(AKrl(AK)TO(.! (0] - yi(O~),
yl 1(
where A K=(A K)TO Ak. Then p-orthogonality of the assets implies that A K is the J-dimen-
sional identity matrix. It follows that
*i I AjOyi 1 i
eAK) =~. =~(AjOy),r' ylAjOAj yl
where /, ie I, is an S-dimensional vector independent of K.
From this, we can conclude that e~(K)=e~(K') if je KnK', i.e. every agent being
able to trade in asset j will choose to trade the same amount of this asset independent of
the other assets she is allowed to trade in. But then total trading volume in any asset has
to be constant over the different markets associated with the subsets K k J. II
In the case of p-orthogonal assets, we can therefore determine trading volume by a
very simple formula.
Lemma 3. Suppose A is a p-orthogonal asset structure. Then vAr) =a~ . rj for every
asset je J and every phase r e [0, If.
22. In Duffle and Jackson (1989), p-orthogonal asset structures emerge as the equilibrium outcome.
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Proof Let re [0, I]J. Then
/1j(r\j, aj) = afLKCJ\{j} (llkEKrk)(II/fl!'K,z,f'j (1 - r/)) = af,
where the penultimate equality follows from Lemma 2, and the ultimate one from simple
multinomial algebra. II
Summarizing this discussion we conclude that in a RPGEI-economy with individuals
characterized by standard CAPM-assumptions, and with a homogeneous distribution of
trading restrictions (Assumption (P)), a unique equilibrium price exists since then prices
are independent of the asset structure (by the Market Partition Lemma). Moreover, since
asset demands in the incomplete market case are projections of the complete market
demands (as can be seen from the proof of Lemma 2), asset demands also are independent
of the asset structure if the assets are orthogonal.
The derivative of the trading volume with respect to the market participation is the
key determinant for the stability of the evolutionary process we consider in the next
section. Therefore, we provide the following two results which conclude the analysis of
the stage economy.
Proof For m =j, the result immediately follows from vir) =rj' /1j and from the fact
that drj/1j = 0 by Corollary 1. If mej, then drmVj = rj' drm/1j' Simple algebra now yields the
formula stated in the lemma. II
Corollary 2. Let re [0, If.
(i) If A is p-orthogonal, then the Jacobian of v is a diagonal matrix with diagonal
entries drjVj = af for every jE J.
(ii) If rj=0 (i.e. if asset j is not adopted within the economy), then the j-th row vector
of the Jacobian of v is given by the j-th unit vector multiplied by the positive scalar
drjVj =/1j(r\j, a j).
Proof
(i) For a p-orthogonal asset structure we know that a[U{j,m} - afUU} = 0 for any
assetsj, mEJ. Hence, our claim follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 II.
(ii) This is obvious from Lemma 4.
This finishes the description of the stage economy.
3. THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
Having described the one-shot stage economy and having shown that equilibria for this
stage economy do in fact exist and are unique, we now turn our attention to the evolution-
ary process generating a sequence of such stage economies, denoted by RPGEI(t) for t e
~o. In order to simplify matters as much as possible, all but one relevant variable are
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assumed to be stationary. In addition to the invariance of
• R S + 1 the commodity space,
• Vi the utility functions,
• 0/ the endowments,
we also assume stationarity of
• A the exogenous set of assets,
over the time path of the RPGEI-economies. Only individual market participation (i.e.
the phases (rl(t), ... , rAt» for t e No) will be updated in each period. Two issues now have
to be addressed: how is a phase ret) translated into a phase ret + 1), and which are the
notions of stationarity and stability to be applied for the analysis of the resulting dynami-
cal process. Both of these issues are discussed in the remainder of this section.
3.1. The transition function
First the relation between two consecutive time periods has to be established. For given
utility functions and endowments the equilibrium itself only depends on the market
participation. We define a stationary transition function
g: [0, If~[O, If, ret + 1) = g(r(t»
connecting consecutive time periods which translates the participation phase r(t) into the
participation phase ret + 1). Hence, as can be inferred from the definition of g, transition
is modelled in a Markovian way, i.e. market participation in period t + 1 depends only on
the market participation in period t and remains unaffected by the history of the process
in the periods preceding time t.23
We now assume that the transition function gAr) of any asset} consists of an aware-
ness coefficient ~(rj) and an adoption coefficient aj(r), i.e. we let
rAt + 1) =gAr(t» =~(rj(t» . aAr(t», }E J.
This definition is motivated by the observation that in order to actively trade in an asset,
agents must first become aware of that asset. Consequently, we introduce the notation
~(rj(t» for the proportion of agents knowing asset} in period t + 1. Whether traders being
aware of an asset then also actually adopt it (by incorporating it into their decision prob-
lem) will be determined by the perceived attractiveness of the market as compared to
already existing markets. In our model, the coefficient aj(r(t» thus denotes the percentage
of traders being aware of asset} and adopting it as a part of their maximization problem
in period t + 1.24
To add more structure to the transition function we make explicit assumptions on
the nature of the diffusion of awareness, d., and the percentage of actual adoption, a..
23. Note that this dynamic process is well-defined only if the RPGEI-equilibria are known to be unique (as is
the case with the quadratic preferences considered here). With multiple equilibria in the stage economies, however,
the transition process would no longer be well-defined as long as no explicit equilibrium selection mechanism were
introduced.
24. The adoption of technical and social innovations has intensively been studied by psychologists and sociol-
ogists. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that adoption is not driven by a rational cost-benefit analysis but
merely by rules of bounded rationality such as imitation (see Rogers (1995) and Rogers and Schoemaker (1971».
Following this observation, we do not base the adoption process on a rational cost-benefit analysis which might
require anticipating the next period's equilibrium (which itself depends on who decides to participate in certain
assets).
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FIGURE 1
Illustration of~
First, we assume that ~(rj) is a simple diffusion of information process, i.e.
According to this diffusion process, knowledge about the existence of asset j can arise
from three sources: rj is the percentage of people who remember asset j from last period."
(l - rj) is the percentage of previously uninformed agents who might get informed by
public information (m;> 0 is called the "marketing coefficient") or by private information
(Wj~O is called the "word of mouth coefficient"). Awareness of an asset only depends on
last period's awareness of this particular asset, but it is completely independent of the
level of awareness of any of the other assets. Hence, there are no "spill-over"-effects with
respect to the information about the existence of an asset.
The diffusion process ~ (rj) is a simple monotone and strictly concave mapping from
[0, 1] into [0, 1]which has a unique stationary point r,=1. See Figure 1 for an illustration
of ~.26
Whereas ~(rj) is the percentage of agents being aware of asset j, aj is the "adoption
coefficient" which determines the percentage of agents being aware of asset j and actually
considering to participate in the market for this asset in the next period t + 1. Again we
suggest a simple multiplicative structure: For K+(r) non-redundant let
where jj represents a function measuring the relative "fitness" of an asset, whereas nj is
supposed to reflect the degree of innovation an asset is offering compared to the other
existing assets. As a consequence, this definition of the coefficients aj implies in general
25. Note that here we implicitly assume that agents do not forget.
26. Note that in the absence of the adoption coefficient Qj the number of people being aware of the financial
innovation willdisplay an S-shaped time-path (upon iteration of our evolutionary process). This implication ofthe
specification of the diffusion process dj is supported by the empirical literature on the diffusion of innovations (see
Rogers (1995)).
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that the transition function for an asset je J is a non-trivial function of the entire partici-
pation phase r: whereas t; only depends on rj> the adoption coefficients aj, and hence the
transition functions gj, depend on r., ... ,rJ. Thus the transition dynamics is inherently
multi-dimensional, and there are potential "spill-over"-effects between the assets.
The concept of fitness of an asset should reflect the expected gains from participating
in this asset, and we take the trading volume to be an indicator for those gains." To fix
ideas we will simply assume that jj(Vj) =Vj' It should be noted that the assumed linearity
of f will have a considerable effect on the results obtained in the following section, since
it precludes complicated functional forms of the composite transition function g.
There are at least three arguments made in the literature which support the assump-
tion that the fitness of a financial asset is positively correlated with the volume it
generates." Firstly, trading volume is often interpreted as a proxy for the liquidity of a
financial asset (for a theoretical foundation of this argument see for example Hopenhayn
and Werner (1996) or Pagano (1989a». Liquid assets are, ceteris paribus, considered to be
more attractive to investors than illiquid ones for three reasons: They can better be real-
ized at short notice (Grossmann and Miller (1988», they are subject to a reduced influence
of strategic behavior-which can either be due to asymmetric information as in Kyle
(1985, 1989) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), or due to imperfect competition as in
Pagano (1989a)-and they are less volatile (see e.g. Pagano (1989b». Secondly, a number
of studies have stressed that trading volume is a major factor governing the actions of
financial intermediaries. Such intermediaries, for example exchanges or brokers, are often
(directly or indirectly) compensated by some form of transaction fees which are pro-
portional to the trading volume; hence, these intermediaries attempt to find and to pro-
mote such financial assets which generate high trading volumes. For models in support of
this argument see for example Duffie and Jackson (1989), Cuny (1993), Hara (1995), or
Bisin (1999)/9 Finally, a third argument can be made in favour of interpreting an asset's
trading volume as its fitness: As Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) have pointed
out, herding behaviour is an important phenomenon in the presence of bounded knowl-
edge and asymmetric information. In this sense, high trading volume can here be inter-
preted as a signal that an asset is widely and successfully used, and which therefore attracts
new consumers who had so far not adopted this asset.
Finishing the specification of the transition function, the factor nir) is supposed to
measure the degree of innovation in the payoffs of asset j relative to the other assets
already established where nj(r) =1 if ~(r)={j} or ~(r) =0. To be more precise, let a
participation rate r be given and assume that ~(f) forms a non-redundant set of assets.
Then one can decompose the payoff Aj for any asset je J into a spanned component S,
and an innovation component l.i, i.e. Aj == l.i + Sj, where S, is the p-orthogonal projection
of Aj onto the span of the otherassets already traded at f. Say S, =LkEK+(f)\{j} Ak ek, where
{j is defined as the unique solution to the optimization problem.
27. Obviously, if the preceding trading volume was zero, then no trader was able to gain anything on that
market. Moreover, the higher the trading volume the more gains, in general. Hence, the fitness function should be
starting at 0 and being monotonically increasing.
28. Black (1986) even defines the success of a financial innovation by the trading volume attracted.
29. Observe that-in order to keep things separate-we have not incorporated this effect into the "marketing
coefficient" mj (which we assumed to be exogenous and fixed), but that we have rather amalgamated all volume-
related effects into the adoption coefficient aj'
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In the sequel we will assume that this "innovation" coefficient has the following simple
shape
nj(r) = JII~W + f3j(r)IISjW,
where f3ir) =rj/(rj+ LkeK+(;')\{j{klekl) if the denominator is different from zero, and
f3j(r) = 1 otherwise
For a motivation of this specific assumption on nj observe that in a model with
restricted participation the degree of "innovativeness" of an asset depends on two factors:
On the one hand, and as acknowledged by the literature on financial innovation" it
depends on the level to which asset j contributes to the spanning opportunities available
in the economy. On the other hand, the degree of novelty of an asset depends on the
relative participation in asset j compared to the participation in the other assets. This has
already been pointed out by Black (1986) who stresses that the availability of well-estab-
lished "cross-hedging" opportunities for a new asset is one of the major reasons for the
failure of this asset. Our formulation of the function nj therefore measures the "spanning
factor" by II~II, and captures the "cross-hedging" factor by introducing the coefficient f3.
Regarding the properties of the function nj, note that f3jE [0, 1] and hence njE [0, 1]
by our normalization assumption IIAj II =1 for all jE J. Moreover, nj is non-decreasing in
rj and continuously differentiable in r.31 Furthermore, for a p-orthogonal asset Aj, it is
obtained that nj = 1 for all rjE [0, 1]. Finally, if Aj has zero participation and is redundant
to some assets with positive market participation, then nj =0. These properties of nj are,
in fact, the only properties which will be used to derive our general results. The examples
given in Subsection 4.2 are computed using the specific function nj defined above.
3.2. Notions ofstationarity and stability
We now first have to look for steady states of the evolutionary process. These are captured
by the following notion of a fixed point of the transition mapping defined by g. Our
notion of stationarity thus describes a situation of market participation rates (and trading
volumes) that sustain themselves over time, allowing for both high participation in some
assets and low participation in other assets.
Definition 2. A participation phase FE [0, If is a stationary equilibrium of the evol-
utionary process if F=g(F).
From the definition of the transition function g it is obvious that r =(0, ... , 0) always
is a stationary equilibrium.
We continue by investigating the stability of stationary equilibria by analysing which
set of assets is robust with respect to some ongoing process of financial innovations. First,
we define stability of a set of assets with respect to the further introduction of new assets,
i.e. financial innovations.
Definition 3. A stationary equilibrium FE [0, I]J with if =°is evolutionarily stable with
respect to the innovation of asset j if the following holds: There exists some £jE (0, 1) such
that for every 1JE (0, £j) the sequence r(t + 1) = g(r(t)), with reO) = (F\j, 1J), t =
30. See for example Duffle and Jackson (1989).
31. Observe that 8 is a function of A, but does not depend on T.
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if J1Ar\j, aj)nj(r)rj< 1
otherwise
0, 1, ... converges to f. Moreover, a stationary participation phase is evolutionarily stable
if it is evolutionarily stable with respect to any innovation.
Thus, a stationary participation structure is evolutionarily stable if the traded assets
can be protected from "mutants" by certain entry barriers for the initial proportion of
traders participating in the new asset markets. Note that if the uniform participation
phase r=(1, ... , I) is a stationary equilibrium, it is also evolutionarily stable since no
more entrants can appear.
Similarly, we ask whether some asset market "remains perfect", i.e. whether an asset
market with complete participation has a tendency to return to the situation of complete
participation if its participation rate is reduced slightly below I.
Definition 4. A stationary participation phase re [0, I]J with 0 = 1 remains perfect with
respect to asset j if the following holds: There exists some £jE (0, I) such that for every ijE
(1 - £1' 1) the sequence ret + 1) =g(r(t», with reO) =(f\j, ij), t =0, 1, ... converges to f.
Moreover, a stationary participation phase remains perfect if it remains perfect with respect
to any asset.
A stronger stability requirement than evolutionary stability and remaining perfect is
given by
Definition 5. A stationary participation phase fE [0, I]J is asymptotically stable with
respect to the subsets of assets KcJ if there exists some e >°such that for every fE [0, I]J
with ij =0,jfl k and with IIf - fll < e the sequence, ret + I) =g(r(t» with reO) =f, t =0, 1, ...
converges to f. Moreover, a stationary phase is asymptotically stable if it is asymptotically
stable with respect to k =J.
Note that participation structures which are asymptotically stable also are evol-
utionarily stable and remain perfect for every asset j while the opposite implication in
general fails to hold. The concepts differ, since evolutionary stability and remaining per-
fect only require robustness with respect to changes in the participation rates of single
assets while asymptotic stability considers small deviations from the market participation
rate in any possible direction.
4. MAIN RESULTS
4.1. Analytical results
We first introduce specific one-dimensional functions h, for every je J, which serve to
greatly simplify much of the following exposition. In fact, for every j e J and for every
(fixed) r\jE [0, 1]J -1 we define
hArj):= gj (r \1' rj)
= {d.i(rj)' nj(r)' J1j(r\1' aj)' rj
d.i(rj)
Thus h, is the one-dimensional function governing the dynamics of rj if the partici-
pation rates, r\j, of the other assets were to be kept fixed. It will turn out in the sequel
that in spite of the potential spill-over effects present in the economy (due to the construc-
tion of nj and J1j which may depend on the entire vector r), all the results for the existence
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FIGURE 2
Generic shapes of the function h, (Lemma 5)
and stability of stationary points derived below can be deduced from the shape of hj' The
following lemma shows that-except for irregular cases-hj essentially takes three possible
shapes, which are depicted in Figure 2.
Lemma 5. Let jEJ and r\jE[O,I]J-I be given, and let Jij=Jiir\j,aj)' Then
hj (rj) := gj(r \h rj) has the following properties:
(i) hAn) =0. Furthermore, hAl) =1 only ifnAr\h I)Jlj~ l.
(ii) IfnAr\j, I)Jij< 1 then hj(rJ<rjfor every rjE(O, 1] and hi (0) < 1.
(iii) Ifnj(r\h l)Jlj> 1 and mjnAr\j,O)/lj> 1 then hj (1) =1, hi (0) > 1, and hArj) > r. for
all rjE(0, 1).
(iv) If nj(r\h I)Jij> 1 and mjnj(r\h O)Jij < 1 then hj(l) =1, hi (0) < 1, and there exists a
unique ijE(O, 1) such that hAij) =ij. Moreover, in this case, h, is differentiable at
f j and hi(ij ) > 1.
Proof
(i) This follows directly from inserting rj =0 and rj=1 into the definition of hj'
(ii) In this case
hAl) =4i(1)nAr\j, I)Jlj< 1,
hence h, ends below the diagona1. Since therefore
hj(rj)~4i(rj )nAr\h rj)Jij' rj~ 4i(I)nj(r\j, 1)/lj' rj< rj,
it follows that h, never crosses the diagonal in the open interval (0, 1). Moreover,
one easily computes the derivative at rj =°as
hi(O)=4i(O)nj(r\}, O)Jlj< 4i(0) =mj~ 1.
(iii) Here, hj (l) =4i(1) =1 by construction. Now consider the function iij defined as
iij (rj) := d,(rj)njv». rj)/lj(r \j, aj)
for every rjE[0, 1]. Clearly, iij is strictly increasing, since d, is strictly increasing
and nj is non-decreasing. Under the assumptions stated it follows that iiAO) > 1.
Hence, ~(rj) > 1 for every rjE[O, 1]. Noting that hj(rj) =min {hi(rj)' rh 4i(rj)} > rj
for every rjE (0, 1), then proves that hj cannot cross the diagonal in the open
interval (0, 1). Furthermore, the assumptions imply that hi (0) =
mjnj(r\}, O)Jij> 1.
BETTZUGE & HENS FINANCIAL INNOVATION 509
i= 1, ... ,I,
(iv) Again, hAl) = 4i(l) = 1 follows by construction. Now, for the function Jij defined
above, one obtains that Jij (0) < 1 and Jij (1) > 1. Hence, due to the strict monoton-
icity of Jib there must be a unique point fjE(0, 1) such that JiAfj) =1. But in this
case hAfj) =hjv» .r, =fj, and r, is unique in (0, 1) as claimed.
In the case considered, the derivative of hj at rj =1 satisfies hj(l) < 1. But then, at fj, h,
must cross the diagonal from below. Since 4i(fj) > fj implies aAfj) < 1, it follows that hj is
differentiable at r.. Hence, hj (fj) > 1. II
To see what is driving this result consider the role of aj: Either it never becomes
constant, then hi is stationary only in rj=o. If, however, it does become constant then, in
a neighbourhood of rj =1, hj is identical with 4i which has a simple shape and which
strictly lies aboves the diagonal.
Therefore, Lemma 5 completely characterizes the possible shapes of hj in all the cases
where mjnAr\b O)llj:t: 1 and n/r\j' 1)llj:t: 1 ("regularity conditions"). Since we are only
concerned with phases r \j which are part of a stationary equilibrium, it suffices to show
that these regularity conditions are met for all stationary points. As the next proposition
demonstrates, this is in fact true for almost all endowments m= (mt, ... , m/)E IR(S+ 1)/.
Lemma 6. For all endowment distributions, except for some set CclR(S+ 1)/ of
Lebesque-measure zero, the regularity conditions mjnj(f\b O)llj:t: I and nj(F\j, 1)J.fj:t: 1, where
J.fj =Ilj(f\j, aj), hold at all stationary equilibria FE[0, 1]J with 14(F) forming a non-redundant
set of assets.
Proof32 Let FE [0, I]J be a stationary equilibrium. As in the Market Partition Lemma,
consider the GEl-economies GEI(F, K) = {IR(S+ 1>, A(F, K), ur, mi)f=I}' where A(F, K) is a
submatrix of A, consisting only of assets je K ~ 14(F) with positive participation rates.
Equilibrium trading volumes are
*. 1 TIT (1 . .)8 1(m) = -:(A(F, K) OA(F, K)f A(F,K) 0 - ml - ylmll ,
r' I(
/. /. *.
where 1(= Li= I (l/yl) and ml = Li=".mll. Hence, 81!~) is a continuously differentiable
function for mE IR(S+ 1)/ and rank dOl8 1(m) = IKI, i.e. 8 1(m) is "controllable" by t». Hence,
b,y the parametric transversality theorem, for all ca except for a set C of measure zero,
85(m):t:0 so that the aggregate trading volume af(m) =L~=1Ie5(m)1 is continuously dif-
ferentiable and controllable by m, i.e. rank dOl(af(m), ... .a; (r») =IKI.
Therefore, for all i», except for a set of measure zero, nAF)J.fj(F\j, af):t: 1 for alljEJ
and for all K c;;, 14(F). A similar argument can be applied for the second regularity con-
dition mjnAr\b O)llj(F\j, af):t: 1, noting that nj is continuously differentiable in r\j. II
The stability properties of the evolutionary process are determined by the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian of the transition function g: [0,If-:>[0, If evaluated at the stationary
equilibria. Therefore, we need to clarify whether g is differentiable at every stationary
phase FE [0, If, where, as has been noted before, for stationary phases in the boundary
of [0, If the derivative has to be taken only in any direction pointing to the interior of
[0, If. Note that the transition function g need not be differentiable at a point where
njvj = 1.
32. This proof uses some parametric transversality theorems (for a precise statement and a thorough dis-
cussion thereof see Magill and Quinzii (1996».
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Proposition 3. For all endowment distributions, except for some set C of measure
zero, the transition function g: [0, If~[O, I]J is continuously differentiable at all stationary
equilibrium phases FE [0, If with 14(F)forming a non-redundant set of assets.
Proof By construction, d.i(rj) and nj(r) are continuously differentiable. Corollary 1
has demonstrated that the volume function vj(r) is continuously differentiable as well.
Hence, it remains to argue that, generically in endowments, nj(F)vj (F) =
nj(F)Jlj(F\h aj)f.j=t:-l for all stationary equilibria Funder consideration. Now gAF)= f.j and
nj(F)vAF) =1 imply d.i(f.j) = f.j and, hence, f.j =1. Therefore, the claim follows as a corollary
from the previous lemma. II
After these preliminaries we can characterize stationary equilibria F in terms of
properties of their coordinates f.j for jE J.
Theorem 1. Suppose 14(F\j, 1) forms a non-redundant set of assets, and let F be a
stationary equilibrium. Let Jlj =Jlj (F). Then
(i) f.j =1 only if nj(F)Jlj~ 1.
(ii) Moreover, at F, let the economy satisfy the regularity conditions, i.e. let
mjnj(F\j, O)Jlj=t:-l and nAF\h I)Jlj=t:-1. Then f.jE (0, 1) only if
nAF\h O)Jljmj< 1< nAF\h I)Jlj.
Such a mixed participation phase is unique in (0, 1).
Proof A stationary equilibrium FE [0, If is a solution to the equation F= g(F), where
gj(F)= min {I, nj(f)Jljf.j}d.i(f.j) for all j = 1, ... ,J. Hence, if F is a stationary equilibrium,
then hAf.j)= f.j for every jEJ (where r., is held fixed). But then, the statements in the
theorem follow directly from Lemma 5. II
From Theorem 1, we get simple conditions for the stationarity of the two extremal
participation structures, zero participation and complete participation in all assets,
respectively.
Corollary 3.
(i) F= (0, ... , 0) always is a stationary equilibrium.
(ii) For any non-redundant set of assets K ~ J, a phase FE [0, I]J with r,= 1 for every
j E K is a stationary equilibrium only if nj(F)Vj (F) ~ 1 for every j E K. Moreover if
nj(F)vj (F) ~ 1 for every j E K and f.j = °for every j'l K then F is a stationary
equilibrium.
(iii) Let A be p-orthogonal. Then, for any non-redundant set of assets KcJ, a phase
FE [0, I]J with f.j =1 for every je K is a stationary equilibrium if and only if
a;~ 1. Moreover, f.jE(O, 1) is part of a stationary equilibrium only if a;mj< 1,
and a; f.j < 1 in which case r, in unique.
Proof Parts (i) and (ii) are obvious from Lemma 5 and Theorem 1. To see (iii)
observe that if A is p-orthogonal, then nj(f) =1 by construction and Jlj(F\j, a j) =a; by
the proof of Lemma 3. Hence nj(F)Jlj = a;' II
In order to determine the stability properties of stationary equilibria, we now com-
pute the derivative of the transition function.
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Lemma 7. For any stationary equilibrium fE[O, If with 14(f) non-redundant andfor
almost all endowments OJ we get:
iff.j=o
iff.j=1
(ii) If f.jE {a, I} and k:;:. j then drkgj(f) =0.
(iii) If f.jE (0, 1) then drjgj (f) > 1.
Proof Recall that gAf) =dAf)aAf), where «o» =f.j+ mAl - f.j) + Wjf.j(1- f.j) and
aj(f) = min {I, nj(f)vj(f)} for every jEJ.
Compute
where
and
if nAf)vAf) > 1, k, j E J.
(i) Suppose k =j and r, =0. Then aAf) =°since vj(f) =0. Moreover, for the same
reason drjaj(f) =nj(f)drjvAf). By Lemma 4, drjvAf) =J1Ar\j, aj)' Hence,
drjgAf) =mjnAf)J1j(r\h aj).
On the other hand, suppose k =j and f.j=1. Then aj(f) =1 and nj(f)vj(f) =nj(f)J1j> 1
by Theorem l(i), so that drjaAf) =0. Hence, drjgj(f) =1 - mj - Wj'
(ii) Suppose k:;:. j. Then, drkl!.i(f.j)=0, since l!.i only depends on rj. If nAf)vj(f) > 1,
then drkaj(f) = 0. If nj (f)Vj (f) < 1, then aj(f) < 1 and since r is a stationary equili-
brium with f.jE {a, I}, it must follow that f.j=°by Theorem l(i). But then, vAt) =
°and, by Lemma 4, drkVj(f) =0, hence drkgj(f) =0.
(iii) Suppose '.JoE (0, 1) is part of the stationary equilibrium. Observe that
drjgAf) =hj (f.j) where r\j =(f., ... , f.j- ., r,+ h ... , f J ) is held fixed. Then The-
orem 1 (ii) and Lemma 5(iv) imply that drjgj(f) > 1. II
The stability properties of stationary equilibria are derived from Lemma 7 by appli-
cation of some well known results of the Theory of Dynamical Systems. A stationary
equilibrium is asymptotically stable if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the transition
function evaluated at the stationary point have absolute value less than 1 (see, for
example, Devaney (1986)). Moreover, a stationary uniform participation phase f which is
asymptotically stable with respect to 14(f) is evolutionarily stable with respect to the
mutation of a new asset j~ 14(f) if the diagonal entry corresponding to this mutation has
absolute value less than 1. This condition for evolutionary stability follows from Lemma
7. Consider a stationary point with f k = 0. Since by Lemma 7, drkgj(f) = °for all j with
f.jE {a, I}, the Jacobian matrix drg is a diagonal matrix at any uniform participation phase,
and therefore, in a small neighbourhood around f, the derivative of g in the direction of
k is given by drjgj(f). A similar argument applies for the stability with respect to small
reductions of participation levels below 1, i.e. for an asset's property to remain perfect.
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Therefore, we get the following stability properties:
Theorem 2. At any stationary equilibrium re {O, I} J with ]4(f) non-redundant, and
for almost all endowments 00, we get:
(i) Iff is asymptotically stable with respect to ]4(f) then r is evolutionarily stable with
respect to the innovation of a non-redundant asset jrt.]4(f) if mjnj(f)J.1j < 1.
(ii) Iff is asymptotically stable with respect to ]4(f) then r is not evolutionarily stable
with respect to the innovation of a non-redundant asset jrt.]4(f) if mjnAf)J.1j > 1.
(iii) If f with ij= 1 is asymptotically stable with respect to ]4(f)\{j} then the partici-
pation structure remains perfect with respect to asset j.
Moreover any stationary equilibrium f with ije (0, 1) for some j e J is not asymptotically
stable.
Proof First assume that f e {O, I} J. Then, by part (ii) of Lemma 7, the directional
derivative of g in the k-th direction is given by the k-th diagonal element of drg(f). Hence,
part (i) of Lemma 7 together with Lemma 5 gives the stability conditions (i), (ii), and (iii).
To show the last statement assume that f is stationary. and that there is some keJ
such that fke (0, 1). Recall from elementary linear algebra that the trace of a matrix is
equal to the sum of its eigenvalues. Part (ii) of Lemma 7 implies for every je J with je
{O, I} that the j-th unit vector is a left eigenvector of drg(f) with corresponding eigenvalue
drjgAf). Since furthermore drkgk(f) > 1 for k with fke (0, 1), at least one eigenvalue of drg(f)
must be greater than one. Hence r is not asymptotically stable. II
Moreover, as the next theorem shows, a stationary equilibrium with full participation
in a complete set of markets is not only evolutionarily stable but also asymptotically
stable. If the economy happens to settle in a complete set of markets it cannot be unsettled
by small perturbations to the participation rates.
Theorem 3. Any stationary equilibrium re {O, I} J with ]4(f) forming a non-redundant
and complete set of markets is asymptotically stable.
Proof To demonstrate asymptotic stability first note that by Lemma 7, drg(f) is a
diagonal matrix because by assumption of Theorem 3 for all je J either ij = °or ij = 1.
Hence locally the transition function g decomposes into J independent functions. There-
fore f is asymptotically stable if every je ]4(f) remains perfect and if r is evolutionarily
stable with respect to any jrt. ]4(f). The former is indeed the case because for f = 1 the j-
th diagonal element is 1 - mj - Wj which is smaller than one. The latter requires to extend
g on a neighbourhood of r to redundant assets. Such an extension which keeps the utility
maximization property of asset demand and which does not destroy the differentiability
of g is always possible, as the following simple example demonstrates.
Let j be such that j(]]4(f) =0 be a set of possible financial innovations, each of
which is redundant to ]4(f), i.e.
Aj =LkeK+(;') Ak8{, je t.
N ow with reference to Definition 3 consider the recursion
rk(t + 1) =r, - Ljel 8i,., rAt),
rj(t + 1) = 1/(t + 1)rAO),
with rk(O)= fk, t =0, 1,2, .ke ]4(f),
with rAO) = e., t = 0, 1,2, ,jei.
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Note that limt~OO =f. Finally note that for any such extension f is evolutionarily
stable because the innovation coefficient, nj(f), is zero for allj~/4(f). Hence, r is indeed
asymptotically stable. II
Finally, in the case of p-orthogonal assets the criterion for evolutionary stability is
independent of the particular equilibrium.
Corollary 4. Let the assets be p-orthogonal. Then a stationary equilibrium re [0, I]J
with /4(f) non-redundant is evolutionarily stable with respect to the innovation of asset
j~/4(f) if afmj< 1. If afmj> 1, then f is not evolutionarily stable with respect to the inno-
vation ofasset j. Moreover, r is asymptotically stable ifand only it it is evolutionarily stable.
Proof By construction nAf) =1 for all jE J if assets are p-orthogonal. Moreover,
by Lemma 3, the equilibrium volume of trade of any asset is independent of the other
assets' market participation. Hence, org(f) is a diagonal matrix, and its stability properties
then are determined by its diagonal entries. II
The simple stability properties of stationary equilibria derived in Theorems 2 and
Theorem 3 and in Corollary 4 rely on two particular features of the transition process:
Firstly, whenever a stationary equilibrium r corresponds to a standard GEl-economy,
i.e. whenever fE {O, I}, then f can locally be characterized by the one-dimensional dynam-
ics described by h, for every je J. In particular, the stability of r only depends on the slope
of hj at r,=0 and r,=1. The derivative hj(O) depends on the marketing coefficient mj, the
coefficient of asset j's trading volume J.1j(f\h a j), and the degree of asset j's "innovative-
ness" nj(f\h 0). If, for example, there is no marketing effort." i.e. mj small, or if assetj is
almost redundant (nj small) or if it does not generate a sufficiently high trading volume
(J.1j is small), then evolutionary stability with respect to asset j follows, i.e. asset j is a
"failure". On the other hand, the derivative hj(l) will always be smaller than 1 since if
ij =1 is a part of a stationary equilibrium then hj necessarily is identical to ~ in a neigh-
bourhood of 1 (for "regular economies", i.e. for almost all endowments), where dj(l) =
1 - mj - Wj < 1. But the fact that the cross-derivatives do not matter in this case (Lemma
7(ii» implies that assetj must be remaining perfect. Hence, any small reduction of market
participation rates of assets in which there is full participation in the stationary equilib-
rium will lead back to full participation.
Secondly, the economy cannot get stuck in a situation of mixed market participation,
where potential spill-over effects might become relevant (i.e. where the cross-derivatives
can be non-zero): In such a situation, eventually, and after any perturbation, every asset
will either be adopted by the entire economy or it will disappear. As can be seen from the
proof of Lemma 7(iii), this instability is implied by the important fact from linear algebra
that the trace of a matrix is equal to the sum of its eigenvalues. Based on this observation,
the lack of stability of mixed participation equilibria can be deduced from the shape of
the one-dimensional functions hj-in spite of the fact that the transition function is multi-
dimensional in any neighbourhood around the mixed participation equilibrium. As a
consequence, the "standard" GEl-economies are the only stable stationary outcomes of
the dynamical process modelled in this paper, and they are characterized by simple, locally
one-dimensional, dynamics.
33. It is commonly found in the empirical literature that marketing is among the key factors that distinguishes
top performing products in financial services (see Cooper, Easingwood, Edgett, Kleinschmidt and Storey (1994».
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Obviously, the simplicity of the results achieved depends on the restrictiveness of the
assumptions made. If any of the assumptions were relaxed then an explicit characteriz-
ation of the transition dynamics would soon become inherently difficult. In this case, one
would have to turn towards computer simulations and numerical analysis. We have used
such methods already in the situation considered in this paper, in order to further illustrate
our model by means of some interesting examples. We will present these examples in
the following subsection." Besides illustrating the general predictions of our model and
indicating a potential approach to more difficult specifications of the stage economies and
the transition process, the simulation programme also allows to derive new results.
Whereas, for example, our results in the general model characterize the local stability of
stationary equilibria, the simulation programme allows to visualize the basins of attraction
of stationary equilibria which often tum out to be much larger than some small s -neigh-
bourhood. Moreover, the simulation programme allows to show the trajectories of the
dynamical process, starting at arbitrary initial values. These trajectories display some
interesting non-monotonic dynamics which could not have been .concluded from our gen-
eral results.
34. The examples are obtained from a simulation programme written by our research assistant Jan Pilgrim.
The programme is based on the simulation programme MACRODYN created in the research group of Volker Bohm
and described in Bohm and Schenk-Hoppe (1998). We are grateful for this support.
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4.2. Numerical examples
The examples presented in this section illustrate the case of "nuts and bolts", the
possibility of stationary mixed participation equilibria, the phenomenon of "path-depen-
dence", and, finally, the possibility that an initially successful asset is later driven out of
the market by some other, even more successful asset.
The first example illustrates the famous case of "nuts and bolts". Hart (1979) has
suggested an example, where a coordination failure between innovating intermediaries
may lead to an inefficient outcome of the innovation process. In a different framework ,
Hart's example is repeated by Heller (1993)and by Che andRajan (1994). The idea behind
this example can be described as follows. Suppose there are two market makers who can
open a market for a certain asset at some fixed cost. Market makers recover these fixed
costs through transaction costs they charge for each unit of the asset traded. Suppose
furthermore that the two assets possibly traded on the two markets are complements with
respect to trading volume. In that case, every asset generates a low trading volume if
introduced while the market for the other asset remains closed; if both markets are opened
simultaneously, however, then trading volume in both assets will be high. Hart (1979),
Heller (1993), and Che and Rajan (1994) now point out that if fixed costs for the opening
of a market are sufficiently high, both market makers may prefer to keep their market
closed because each market maker expects the other one to do so. Due to this coordination
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failure the economy might therefore get stuck in the inefficient no trade--equilibrium
without any available assets. For obvious reasons, this example is usually referred to as
the "nuts and bolts" example.
In our example two assets can be complementary in such a way that the innovation
of only one of them is not successful. In our model, however, both assets only get started
if they are introduced simultaneously and with a level of participation which exceeds a
certain threshold in the open interval (0, 1).35 Note that this interesting aspect of financial
innovation cannot be analysed in the traditional "nuts and bolts" examples since innovat-
ing in these models means to increase participation rates abruptly from zero to one.
The characteristics of the economy in our version of the "nuts-and-bolts" example
are given by:
Example 1. /=2, J=2, S=2, PI=0·5, P2=O·5, yl=0·6, y2=OA, 001=
(l,.J2,0 ·125)T, oo2= (l , O·125, .J2) T, A1=(l,I)T, A2=(0,.J2)T, ml=l, m2=I,wl=0,
W2= 0.
Figure 3(a) shows the basins of attraction for Example 1, while Figure 3(b) shows
trajectories of the dynamical process implied by Example 1.36
35. In Example I, introducing both assets with participation rates r1(0) = r,(O) = 0·25 suffices to get both mar-
kets started, whilst choo sing r1(0) = r2(0) = 0.2 will cause both assets to eventually die out.
36. In these and the following figures, the horizontal (vertical) axis displays the participation rate of the first
asset , i .e. r, (the participation rate of the second asset, i.e. r2)' Different basins of attraction are shaded differently.
Finally, trajectories read as moving from dot to dot.
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The next example shows the possibility of a mixed participation equilibrium. The
characteristics of the economy in Example 2 are:
Example 2. 1= 2, J =2, S =3, PI =1/3, P2 =1/3, P3 =1/3, r' =0-4, r' =0,3, (01 =
(1,2,0,0)T, (02 =(1, 0, 0, 2)T, AI =(M, - Jf.5, 0) T, A 2 =(0, .Jff6, Jf.4)T, m, =0,5,
m2 =O' 5, WI =0·4, W2 =0-4.
In Figure 4(a) there is a mixed equilibrium at the point where the basins of attraction
of the four uniform participation equilibria "kiss" each other. Figure 4(b) nicely illustrates
the instability of the mixed participation equilibrium. Note that there are mixed partici-
pation equilibria also at r = c.. 0) and r = (0, '2)' These stationary equilibria are not
asymptotically stable since slight variations in own participation cause the participation
phase to divert from them (as predicted by Theorem 2), moving either towards full or
zero participation. In this case, these mixed participation equilibria on the boundary also
are evolutionarily unstable."
Example 3 illustrates the phenomenon of "path dependence" or " lock-in" which
often occurs in evolutionary models with network externalities (see, e.g. Arthur (1989) or
37. Note that assets A, and A 2 are not p-orthogonal so that the last statement of Corollary 4 is not
contradicted.
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David (1993». If the innovation path were started with the introduction of asset I (asset
2), it would end at the stationary point in which only asset I (asset 2) is traded.
The characteristics of Example 3 are:
Example 3. 1=2, J =2, S =3, PI =1/3, P2 =1/3, P3 =1/3, r' =0-4, y2=0,3, 001 =
(1,2,0,0)7", 002=(1,0 ,0,2)1', A I = ( J[.5, - J[.5, O) T, A2= (0, M, ../f:4)T, ml=0·7,
m« =0,7, WI =0,3, W2 =0·3.
Figure 5(a) shows the corresponding basins of attraction while Figure 5(b) displays
some trajectories.
The last example illustrates how an asset can be driven out of the market even though
every asset "remains perfect" (see Theorem 2). This can happen if a stationary equilibrium
is not evolutionarily stable with respect to the innovation of some new asset, and if, in
the presence of the new asset, some of the former assets do no longer generate sufficient
trading volume to remain a part of a stationary equilibrium.
Example 4. 1= 2, J =2, S =2, PI =0,5, P2 =0,5, yl =0,25, y2 =0·25, 001 =(1, 3, 0)1',
002=(1, 0, 3)T, Al =(.fl, 0) T , A 2=(1, -1) 1', ml =0·5, m2 =0,5, WI =0,5, W 2 =0·5.
The basin of attraction of the point (0, I) contains the whole square (0, If Figure
6 illustrates the dynamics of "being driven out" by some trajectories of the dynamical
process.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a novel evolutionary approach to the analysis of innovation in
financial markets. We have superimposed an evolutionary process on to a GEl-model
with restricted participation and have shown that the stationarity and stability notions
known from other branches of evolutionary economics nicely carryover to our setting.
Our results characterize stationary equilibria and give a complete characterization of their
evolutionary and asymptotic stability properties . Being based on bounded rationality,
these results are well in line with the empirical literature on the reasons for the success
and the failure of financial innovations.
This paper could only give an introductory treatment of the evolutionary approach
to financial innovation. Further research will have to be conducted along two main lines.
On the one hand, the simple structure of the model presented could be extended in
various directions. Firstly, the approach could be applied to examples other than the
CAPM. Secondly, further effort could extend the model towards cases not using the sim-
plifying independence assumptions. Finally, it might be considered whether consecutive
time periods could be linked by more than just the asset dynamics, for example by feed-
back effects of asset trades on the agents' endowments, by longer-lived assets, and by
more general asset payoffs.
On the other hand, it should be attempted to endogenize the transition function
between the stage economies. As a first step in this direction, Guth and Ludwig (2000)
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modify our paper by modelling a process of social learning in a sequence of CAPM-
economies with (endogenously) restricted participation. Their approach allows to
explicitly derive the transition of market participation rates from one period to the next;
in their model, this transition is based on expected utility comparisons in the sense of
imitation and experimentation. It turns out that this transition process will naturally con-
verge to complete markets-at least, as assumed in our paper, if there are no a priori
upper bounds on the number of assets an agent can participate in.
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